报告题目：The Effect of Inequality on Relation Specific Investment and Hold Up: A Cross-Cultural Examination
The hold-up problem can arise between a buyer and a seller when contracts are incomplete and seller investment is buyer specific. In such circumstances there can be too little investment if sellers expect to be held up. There can also be bargaining failure if sellers who do invest refuse to accept “unfair” offers. Our experiment investigates the role of inequality on the hold-up problem by varying the initial endowments of the buyer and sellers. The research also investigated the role of culture by comparing behavior of Chinese subjects and US subjects. Inequality has a bigger impact on US investment than Chinese subjects. Chinese sellers invest at higher rates than US subjects, but they demand higher prices than US sellers resulting in more bargaining failures.
Rudy Santore：美国田纳西大学经济系副教授，博士生导师，从事产业组织理论、博弈论与信息经济学相关研究。美国经济协会、美国金融管理协会、美国法律与经济协会、南美经济协会及欧洲经济协会等学术机构特邀成员。American Economic Review, European Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Economic Inquiry, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Education, Economics Bulletin, The China Economic Review，等25个国际顶级杂志的特约审稿人。在European Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Economic Inquiry等国际顶级SSCI期刊发表论文20余篇